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DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE,  
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION: ON LIBERTY 
INTERESTS IN THE CHILD PLACEMENT CONTEXT 
MARK STRASSER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts and commentators suggest that because adoption is a creature of 
statute, there can neither be a right to adopt nor a right to be adopted. They 
further argue that the case law supports their position, claiming that the United 
States Supreme Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and 
Reform (OFFER)1 expressly rejected the right to adopt or be adopted. Yet, the 
relevant constitutional jurisprudence is much more nuanced than these courts 
and commentators would have one believe. The focus of discussion should not 
be on whether there is a right to adopt or be adopted per se, but on whether 
there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest either in being adopted or in 
the state’s not erecting arbitrary and unduly burdensome barriers to adoption. 
The relevant case law on this matter suggests that there is  a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in this area, both because of a related jurisprudence 
which establishes that children have some protected rights in the placement 
context and because OFFER is much more supportive of various parties’ 
interests in adoption than might first be thought. 
Part II of this article discusses the rights of foster care children with respect 
to the kinds of care that they receive, arguing that the jurisprudence in this area 
suggests that the interests of those parties who would adopt or be adopted may 
well have constitutional weight. Part III discusses OFFER and its implications 
for state limitations on adoption. The article concludes that the interests 
implicated in adoption are or should be constitutionally protected, at least 
where there are no competing interests of a biological parent at stake. 
II. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS IN THE FOSTER CARE CONTEXT 
Courts in many of the circuits have recognized that foster children have 
limited rights against the state with respect to the care that they receive. While 
the developing jurisprudence in this area does not establish that there is or 
should be a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in adopting or being 
adopted, that jurisprudence is nonetheless suggestive that some of the interests in 
the adoption context must be accorded constitutional weight. Further, this 
developing jurisprudence utterly undermines the contention that there can be 
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 1. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
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no constitutionally protected interests in adoption due to its being a creature of 
statute. Precisely because foster care is a creature of statute but nonetheless 
implicates constitutional interests, the constitutional analysis involving adoption 
rights must be much more nuanced than many courts and commentators seem 
to appreciate. 
A. Rights to Adequate Care 
Courts and commentators sometimes suggest that because adoption is a 
creature of the state,2 there can be no adoption rights. Yet, the same might be 
said of foster care,3 and the law nonetheless recognizes that children have rights 
in the foster care context.4 While those rights are not equivalent to a right to be 
adopted, they are nonetheless helpful to consider when examining the kinds of 
interest the Constitution does or should take account of in the placement 
context.5 
The right of foster children to receive adequate care has been recognized in 
various jurisdictions. As the Washington Supreme Court explains in Braam ex 
rel. Braam v. State,  
Foster children, because of circumstances usually far beyond their control, have 
been removed from their parents by the State for the child’s own best interest . . . 
Foster children need both care and protection. The State owes these children 
more than benign indifference and must affirmatively take reasonable steps to 
provide for their care and safety.6 
The right described in Braam is not a right to a permanent placement in the 
perfect home.7 Much of the foster care rights jurisprudence focuses on 
preventing children from being subjected to very dangerous conditions. Thus, 
 
 2. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(“Unlike biological parentage, which precedes and transcends formal recognition by the state, 
adoption is wholly a creature of the state.”); Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) 
(“[A]doption in this State is ‘solely the creature of . . . statute[.]’” (citing Matter of Eaton, 305 N.Y. 
162, 165 (N.Y. 1953))); Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Court, Legislatures and 
Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 936 (2000) (“In the United States, adoption is a 
creature of state law.”); Toni L. Craig, Comment, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect 
Unwed Fathers in Contested Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 403 (1990) (“Like foster parent 
contracts, adoptions are creatures of state law.”). 
 3. See Renfro v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Human Servs., 884 F.2d 943, 944 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(“The nature of the foster care relationship is distinctly different from that of the natural family; 
namely, it is a temporary arrangement created by state and contractual agreements.”); Collier v. 
Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D. Colo. 1991) (“The adoptive family’s rights, like those of the foster 
family, arise from state statute.”). 
 4. See Nicini v. Morra 212 F.3d 798, 807 (3d Cir. 2000) (“After DeShaney, many of our sister 
courts of appeals held that foster children have a substantive due process right to be free from harm 
at the hands of state-regulated foster parents.”). 
 5. See Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that adoption 
and foster care are both creatures of state law). 
 6. 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003).  
 7. Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp.2d 476, 507 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[T]his right to freedom from 
harm under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle Plaintiffs to an 
‘optimal level of care and treatment.’”) (citing B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1397–98 (N.D. Ill. 
1989)). 
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the Braam court explains that “at its core, foster children have a substantive due 
process right to be free from unreasonable risk of harm, including a risk flowing 
from the lack of basic services, and a right to reasonable safety.”8 However, this 
right to reasonable safety is not merely a right not to be placed in very 
dangerous settings—it also includes the right to have basic needs met. Thus, 
when explaining the “right to reasonable safety,”9 the Braam court explains that 
“the State, as custodian and caretaker of foster children must provide conditions 
free of unreasonable risk of danger, harm, or pain, and must include adequate 
services to meet the basic needs of the child.”10 
Many of the cases involving this substantive due process right have 
involved foster children who have suffered physical or sexual abuse as a result 
of being placed in a dangerous setting. For example, in one case, a seven-year-
old was allegedly subjected to repeated sexual abuse by an intern hired by the 
Department of Child and Family Services, notwithstanding the intern’s history 
of mental illness and drug problems.11 In another, two children placed in a foster 
home were subjected to repeated sexual abuse by men living in the home.12 In 
yet another, three children were allegedly subjected to abuse by the teenage son 
of the operators of the foster home.13 Other cases involved no sexual abuse but 
instead severe physical abuse leading to grave injury or death.14 Sometimes the 
charges involved both physical and sexual abuse.15 In short, many of the cases 
involved foster children who had been subjected to egregious treatment, 
although in these cases the issue was not whether the conduct against the 
children was wrong or even criminal but, instead, whether the relevant state 
actors had been sufficiently culpable that they should be subject to a § 1983 
action.16 
B. The Standard for Determining Whether the State Has Met Its Obligations 
In the cases described above, the plaintiffs claimed the state had deprived 
them of protected rights without due process of law. As the Tenth Circuit 
explains, “Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for ‘the deprivation of 
 
 8. Braam, 81 P.3d at 857. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Kitzman-Kelley, on behalf of Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 12. Kara B. by Albert v. Dane County, 555 N.W.2d 630, 631–32 (Wis. 1996). See also Yvonne L., 
by and through Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1992) (child 
allegedly sodomized and raped by another child residing there); Whitley v. N.M. Children, Youth & 
Families Dep’t, 184 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1149 (D.N.M. 2001) (child assaulted by adolescent patient living 
in same facility). 
 13. Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. Supp.2d 638, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also Wendy H. by 
and through Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (child sexually 
abused by teenage son of foster parents). 
 14. See White by White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1997) (child died from blows to 
head while in foster care); Taylor by and through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir. 
1987) (child suffered severe and permanent injury inflicted by foster mother). 
 15. See Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1981) (foster child 
subjected to physical and sexual abuse at hands of foster father). 
 16. For a discussion of the differing levels of culpability required in different jurisdictions to 
meet the relevant standard, see notes 22–87 and accompanying text infra. 
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any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.’”17 
When these § 1983 actions are brought, the claim is not merely, for 
example, that a private party has harmed a foster child, even severely. As the 
Third Circuit explains, “the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative 
duty upon the state to protect its citizens.” 18 Rather, the claim is that the state 
played an important role in bringing about the abuse of these children, for 
example, because the state removed those children from their homes and placed 
them in the setting where they were subjected to abuse. 
When the state has children in its custody, the state has taken on a special 
obligation with respect to their care, which the state fails to meet if it puts 
children in unreasonably dangerous settings.19 “[W]hen the state enters into a 
special relationship with a particular citizen, it may be held liable for failing to 
protect him or her from the private actions of third parties. This liability attaches 
under § 1983 when the state fails, under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to 
protect the health and safety of the citizen to whom it owes an affirmative 
duty.”20 
Currently, there are two competing standards for determining whether a 
state actor is liable under § 1983 for failing to meet its obligations to the foster 
children in its care. The Braam court offered one, concluding that the “proper 
inquiry is whether the State’s conduct falls substantially short of the exercise of 
professional judgment, standards, or practices.”21 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
reached a similar conclusion.22 However some courts have adopted a deliberate 
indifference or a shock-the-conscience standard. The Eighth Circuit explains, 
In the context of this custodial relationship, a substantive due process violation 
will be found to have occurred only if the official conduct or inaction is so 
egregious or outrageous that it is conscience-shocking. When deliberation is 
practical, the officials’ conduct will not be found to be conscience-shocking 
unless the officials acted with deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference 
will be found only if the officials were aware of facts from which an inference 
 
 17. Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 886 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See also Collier, 763 F. Supp. at 475 (“To 
state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that he was 
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that any such 
deprivation was achieved under color of law.”). 
 18. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1369 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
 19.  
A relationship between the state and foster children arises out of the state’s affirmative act 
in finding the children and placing them with state-approved families. By so doing, the 
state assumes an important continuing, if not immediate, responsibility for the child’s 
well-being. In addition, the child’s placement renders him or her dependent upon the 
state, through the foster family, to meet the child’s basic needs. 
See D.R.., 972 F.2d at 1372 (citing Taylor, 818 F.2d at 794–97). 
 20. Id. at 1369 (citing Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, Ala., 880 F.2d 348, 352 (11th Cir. 
1989)). 
 21. Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858 (Wash. 2003). 
 22. Kara B. by Albert v. Dane County, 555 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis. 1996) (“We hold that those 
entrusted with the task of ensuring that children are placed in a safe and secure foster home owe a 
constitutional duty that is determined by a professional judgment standard.”). 
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could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and the officials 
actually drew that inference.23 
Other courts have equated the shock-the-conscience and deliberate indifference 
standards, at least in the foster care context.24 
These two different standards stem from different United States Supreme 
Court cases–on the one hand Estelle v. Gamble25 and County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis26(Estelle-Lewis standard)  and on the other Youngberg v. Romeo27 (Youngberg 
standard).28 The former standard seems more demanding than the latter, 
although some courts have implied that in the context of foster care it will not 
matter which standard is chosen.29 
In Estelle, a prisoner, J. W. Gamble, brought a § 1983 action contending that 
he had been subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment”30 by virtue of the poor medical treatment that he had 
received while an inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections.31 The Estelle 
Court explained that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed 
by the Eighth Amendment,”32 and that “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s 
serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.”33 The Court 
cautioned, however, that the decision did not stand for the proposition that 
“every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment 
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.34 Neither accident35 nor mere 
negligence36 would suffice to establish the relevant level of culpability. 
In Lewis, the issue was “whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through 
deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed 
at apprehending a suspected offender.”37 The Court held that “in such 
circumstances only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of 
 
 23. James ex rel. James v. Friend, 458 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
 24. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Impact Project, Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-2074, 2005 WL 1459333, *1 (E.D. Pa. 
June 16, 2005) (mem.) (“In the foster care context, conduct that is ‘deliberately indifferent’ will shock 
the conscience.” (citing Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir. 1983))); Susavage v. Bucks County 
Schools Intermediate Unit No. 22, No. Civ.A. 00-6217, 2002 WL 109615, *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2002) 
(mem.) (“Where the state actor has time to ‘make unhurried judgments,’ conduct which is 
deliberately indifferent will shock the conscience.”). 
 25. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 26. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 27. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 28. See infra notes 31–49 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of these cases. 
 29. See Yvonne L., by and through Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (suggesting that there is little if any difference between the two standards). 
 30. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101. 
 31. See id. at 98. 
 32. Id. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 33. Id. at 104–105. 
 34. Id. at 105. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 106. 
 37. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). 
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arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, 
necessary for a due process violation.”38 The Court noted that its shock-the-
conscience standard was fact-specific, because “[d]eliberate indifference that 
shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another.”39 For 
example, as the term implies, “the standard is sensibly employed only when 
actual deliberation is practical.”40 The Court illustrated this by pointing out that 
“in the custodial situation of a prison, forethought about an inmate’s welfare is 
not only feasible but obligatory under a regime that incapacitates a prisoner to 
exercise ordinary responsibility for his own welfare.”41 
As the Lewis Court noted, the case before it did not involve a situation in 
which the officer had ample time for reflection. The officer had to make a split-
second decision, and “when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer’s 
instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to 
harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates ‘the large concerns of the 
governors and the governed.’”42 The case involving a high-speed chase is to be 
contrasted with the prison case, since “liability for deliberate indifference of 
inmate welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time 
to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely 
uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.”43 Thus, where officials 
with individuals in their care are afforded sufficient time for investigation and 
reflection, they may well be held accountable for their deliberate indifference 
with respect to the welfare of those in their charge. 
The deliberate indifference standard discussed in Estelle and Lewis is to be 
contrasted with the professionalism standard suggested in Youngberg. In 
Youngberg, an inmate involuntarily committed to a state institution for the 
mentally handicapped claimed that he had “a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training within the institution; and 
that petitioners infringed these rights by failing to provide constitutionally 
required conditions of confinement.”44 The Youngberg Court explained that there 
is “a duty to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. . . . The 
State also has the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution.”45 
Of course, if the Court is recognizing a duty to provide such care, the Court 
should provide some way of knowing when that duty has been met. The 
Youngberg Court offered the following criterion: “liability may be imposed only 
when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that 
the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”46 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 850. 
 40. Id. at 851. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 853. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S 327, 332 (1986)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). 
 45. Id. at 324. 
 46. Id. at 323. 
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This standard, while not lax, is nonetheless easier for a plaintiff to meet than is 
the deliberate indifference standard.47 The Court justified imposing a less 
rigorous standard in this context because “[p]ersons who have been 
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish.”48 If, indeed, the relevant standard is to be determined in 
light of whether the confined individuals had been responsible for their own 
confinement, then there are important implications for which standard is 
appropriate in the foster care context. Foster children are much more likely to 
have been victimized than to have been victimizers.49 They thus would seem 
entitled to comparatively more considerate treatment and the correspondingly 
less demanding criterion for them to establish a § 1983 violation especially when 
they have been subjected to egregious physical or sexual abuse. 
C. Application of Estelle-Lewis and Youngberg in the Context of Foster Care 
Various lower courts have suggested that children in foster care are 
analogous in important ways to individuals who are either incarcerated or 
institutionalized,50 and that the kinds of obligations of care placed on officials in 
a prison or other institutional setting are illustrative of the kinds of obligations 
that officials in the foster care setting also have.51 While these courts recognize 
that foster care should be differentiated from institutionalized care in some 
respects, they tend to believe that these differences are a matter of degree rather 
than of kind.52 
As an initial matter, it might be helpful to consider why courts are even 
comparing and contrasting these different kinds of settings. The impetus for this 
analysis comes from DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services.53  
DeShaney involved an action on behalf of a little boy, Joshua, whose father 
had beaten him so severely that he was “expected to spend the rest of his life 
 
 47. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing possible differences in the 
subjective requirements of these standards). 
 48. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22. 
 49. Cf. Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (“Foster children, because of 
circumstances usually far beyond their control, have been removed from their parents by the State 
for the child’s own best interest.”). 
 50. Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. Supp.2d 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Numerous courts 
have imposed a constitutional duty to protect foster children by analogy to involuntarily 
institutionalized individuals.”). 
 51. Taylor by and through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (“We hold that 
a child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal 
institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may bring a section 
1983 action for violation of fourteenth amendment rights.”). 
 52.  
[T]he analogy between foster children on the one hand and prisoners and institutionalized 
persons on the other is incomplete . . . Nonetheless, any distinctions between children 
placed in foster care and the prisoners at issue in Estelle or the institutionalized mentally 
retarded persons at issue in Youngberg are matters of degree rather than of kind. 
Nicini v. Morra 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 53. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
06__STRASSER.DOC 5/27/2008  2:09:09 PM 
230 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 15:223 2008 
confined to an institution for the profoundly retarded.”54 Joshua and his mother 
brought a § 1983 action against various members of the Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services,55 claiming that the failure of various state officials 
to protect him “deprived him of his liberty in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”56 
The DeShaney Court began its analysis by noting that “nothing in the 
language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, 
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”57 The 
Court explained that as “a general matter . . . a State’s failure to protect an 
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the 
Due Process Clause,”58 although the Court was careful to note that “in certain 
limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative 
duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals.”59 For 
example, “when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there 
against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to 
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”60 Thus, while 
the state does not violate due process by failing to prevent one private 
individual from injuring another, the state may well violate due process in 
certain special circumstances where the state itself took on additional 
obligations. 
The DeShaney Court differentiated between the general rule respecting the 
state’s lack of a duty to protect private persons from other private persons and 
the special kind of case in which the state has taken an individual into custody 
by noting that: 
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an 
individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the 
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs–e.g., food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on 
state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.61 
In essence the Court is suggesting that the due process protections are 
triggered when the state takes custody of an individual or limits the individual’s 
liberty in some way—without that trigger, even egregious harm will not 
implicate due process guarantees.62 The Court explained in a note that “the 
 
 54. Id. at 193. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 191. 
 57. Id. at 195. 
 58. Id. at 197. 
 59. Id. at 198. 
 60. Id. at 199–200. 
 61. Id. at 200. 
 62.  
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the 
individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, 
or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the “deprivation of liberty” trigger-
ing the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty in-
terests against harms inflicted by other means. 
Id. 
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protections of the Due Process Clause, both substantive and procedural, may be 
triggered when the State, by the affirmative acts of its agents, subjects an 
involuntarily confined individual to deprivations of liberty which are not 
among those generally authorized by his confinement.”63 A prisoner who has 
been sentenced to a term of years will not additionally have been sentenced to 
receive inadequate medical care, and thus an incarcerated individual would 
have a § 1983 action if, for example, he was deliberately subjected to egregiously 
poor treatment. 
Courts have considered DeShaney and concluded that foster children have 
the requisite special relationship with the state to trigger potential due process 
protections.64 For example, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that “prisoners, 
individuals committed against their will to mental institutions, and children in 
state run foster care [have] a special relationship with the state.”65 This special 
relationship entails an “affirmative duty to protect [which] arises from the 
limitation which the state has imposed on the child’s freedom to act on her own 
behalf.”66 
Notwithstanding the existence of this obligation to protect foster children, § 
1983 actions are difficult to maintain whether the professional judgment or the 
reckless indifference standard is used. Indeed, there is some question as to 
whether the standards differ. For example, the Tenth Circuit itself expressed 
doubt about whether there was much difference between the deliberate 
indifference and the professional judgment standards.67 
The confusion regarding whether the standards actually differ may be 
explained in part by the professional judgment standard having been given an 
interpretation by the Seventh Circuit which makes it virtually indistinguishable 
from the deliberate indifference standard. 68 When explaining the applicable 
standard, the Seventh Circuit in Lewis v. Anderson  noted that “in the context of 
child placement by an adoption agency, that agency officials and case workers 
 
 63. Id. at 200 (footnote.8). 
 64. See, e.g., Whitley v. N.M. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t, 184 F. Supp.2d 1146, 
1155 (D.N.M. 2001) (noting that the Tenth Circuit relied on Youngberg and DeShaney in its analysis of 
the substantive due process rights which foster children have); Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. 
Supp.2d 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing the substantive due process rights of children in foster 
care). 
 65. Whitley, 184 F. Supp.2d at 1155 (citing DeAnzona v. Denver, 222 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir. 
1992)). 
 66. Id. at 1154–1155 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200). 
 67. See Yvonne L., by and through Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (“As applied to a foster care setting we doubt there is much difference in the two 
standards.”). See also Whitley, 184 F. Supp.2d at 1156 (“In Yvonne L., the Tenth Circuit expressed 
‘doubt’ as to whether there was much difference between the professional judgment standard and 
deliberate indifference when applied in the foster care setting.”) (citing Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894). 
 68. Both the Second and the Sixth Circuits have suggested that the deliberate indifference 
standard is appropriately used in § 1983 actions involving foster care. See Doe v. New York City 
Dep’t of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[O]fficials in charge of the agency being sued 
must have displayed a mental state of ‘deliberate indifference’ in order to ‘meaningfully be termed 
culpable’ under § 1983.”). See also Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 
1990) (suggesting that children in “state-regulated foster homes” have a due process right to be free 
of unnecessary harm and that deliberate indifference on the part of state officials will have to be 
established to bring a § 1983 action successfully). 
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are liable only if they violated ‘the right of a child in state custody not to be 
handed over by state officers to a foster parent or other custodian, private or 
public, whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser.’”69 The court made 
clear that this test does not “impose some kind of duty of inquiry in these 
cases.”70 Thus, the court explained, liability cannot be imposed “on the basis of 
facts they did not actually know or suspect, even if they might have learned 
about disqualifying information if they had conducted a more thorough 
inquiry.”71 Instead, it must be shown that the “defendants actually knew of or 
suspected the existence of child abuse in the prospective adoptive family.”72 To 
support that its analysis was in accord with the relevant constitutional 
jurisprudence, the Anderson court cited the Lewis shock-the-conscience test.73 
The court’s citing Lewis would be unsurprising were it applying the shock-
the-conscience or the deliberate indifference standards. The Anderson court was 
not trying to do that but, instead, was trying to apply the professional judgment 
standard developed in the circuit in K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan.74 
When explicating the standard to be used in evaluating a § 1983 action in 
the foster care context, the K.H. court suggested that Youngberg rather than 
Estelle-Lewis was the relevant standard.75 The court made clear that it was 
applying the professional judgment standard, noting that “child welfare 
workers and their supervisors have a secure haven from liability when they 
exercise a bona fide professional judgment as to where to place children in their 
custody.”76 The court explained that child welfare workers will face potential 
liability “[o]nly if without justification based either on financial constraints or on 
considerations of professional judgment they place the child in hands they know 
to be dangerous or otherwise unfit.”77 
Yet, other courts describing the professional judgment standard do not 
read it as only affording “the right of a child in state custody not to be handed 
over by state officers to a foster parent or other custodian, private or public, 
whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser.”78 For example, when 
describing the relevant standard, the Tenth Circuit suggests, “If defendants 
knew of the asserted danger to plaintiffs or failed to exercise professional 
judgment with respect thereto . . . and if an affirmative link to the injuries 
plaintiffs suffered can be shown, then under the analysis set forth hereafter 
 
 69. 308 F.3d 768,773 (citing K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir.1990)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 775. 
 74. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Anderson, 308 F.3d at 775–776 (“If state actors are to be 
held liable for the abuse perpetrated by a screened foster parent, under K.H. the plaintiffs must 
present evidence that the state officials knew or suspected that abuse was occurring or likely.”) 
(citing K.H., 914 F.2d at 852). 
 75. See K.H., 914 F.2d at 853 (“Youngberg establishes an intelligible standard of liability 
(conformity to minimal professional standards[)]”). 
 76. Id. at 854. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 852 (emphasis in original). 
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defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”79 Thus, on the Tenth 
Circuit’s reading, an individual who exercised no professional judgment and, 
for example, did not even look at the relevant files or do any investigation 
whatsoever but instead decided where to place a child by flipping a coin might 
be liable for harms directly resulting from that placement. However, where 
subjective knowledge of the danger is required, no liability would be imposed 
even were someone to decide placements by flipping a coin.80 
At least one way to distinguish these standards involves whether the pro-
fessionals can have the relevant information and conclusions imputed to them 
when they have failed to conduct the necessary investigations.81 As the Tenth 
Circuit explained when explicating the professional judgment standard, “‘Fail-
ure to exercise professional judgment’ . . . does not require actual knowledge the 
children will be harmed, it implies abdication of the duty to act professionally in 
making the placements.”82 In contrast, consider James ex rel. James v. Friend,83 in 
which the Eighth Circuit applied the deliberate indifference standard and dis-
missed a § 1983 action precisely because the relevant subjective knowledge on 
the part of the defendants could not be established.84 Had a “knew or should 
have known” standard been used, the James court might have reached a differ-
ent result.85 
Certainly, there are benefits and drawbacks to the use of either standard. 
Use of the knew-or-should have-known professional judgment standard would 
create an incentive for those responsible for placing children in foster care to pay 
 
 79. Yvonne L., by and through Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 890 (10th 
Cir. 1992).  
 80. See Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2002) (“If state actors are to be held 
liable for the abuse perpetrated by a screened foster parent, under K.H. the plaintiffs must present 
evidence that the state officials knew or suspected that abuse was occurring or likely.”). 
 81. See Whitley v. N.M. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t, 184 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1155 (D.N.M. 
2001) (“[I]n order to hold the social workers liable, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the social workers 
knew of the asserted danger to plaintiff or failed to exercise professional judgment, that is, that they 
abdicated their duty to act professionally, thereby causing injury.”). 
 82. See Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894. 
 83. 458 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 84. See id. at 730 (“James has presented evidence that shows that appellees were aware of facts 
from which an inference might have been drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. He 
has not, however, presented sufficient evidence to show that any of the appellees actually drew such 
an inference.”); see also id. at 730–31 (“The most that can be said about Friend, Hardy, or Valade 
based on this record is that they were insufficiently skeptical about the Dilleys’ explanations for 
Dominic’s injuries. Their willingness to accept those explanations does not rise to the level of a 
substantive due process violation.”). A separate issue is whether the Plaintiff had in fact met the 
burden of presenting enough proof regarding the subjective understanding of the defendant. See id. 
at 732 (Lay, J, dissenting) (“Specifically, there is evidence that Friend actually drew the inference that 
the Dilleys posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Dominic.”). 
 85. Courts might well uphold a finding of liability where foreseeability rather than subjective 
knowledge is the relevant test, although foreseeability might also be thought part of the deliberate 
indifference test. 
Because BCIU was aware of Cynthia’s medical condition which prevented her from sitting 
upright or riding unattended, failure to insure a safe transport system for Cynthia prior to 
subjecting her to the risk of foreseeable serious injury could be viewed as a “failure to act 
appropriately in light of known or obvious risk,” that is, deliberate indifference. 
See, e.g., Susavage, 2002 WL 109615 at *15. 
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close attention and discover the relevant information, since they would not be 
immune by virtue of having had no subjective knowledge of the relevant dan-
gers.86 Use of the deliberate indifference standard would implicitly, if not explic-
itly, acknowledge some of the difficult conditions under which state officials op-
erating in the foster care field find themselves, including inadequate training,87 
unrealistic caseloads,88 and inadequate funding.89 
D. The Duty to Do More than Refrain from Exposing to Danger 
The above discussion is focused on the state’s responsibility not to expose 
foster children to great danger. Yet, the 14th Amendment has been understood 
to impose further obligations on the state, e.g., to provide at least minimal levels 
of basic goods. For example, in B.H. v. Johnson,90 a federal district court in Illinois 
recognized that the state assumes “some responsibility for the emotional as well 
as physical well-being of children in its care.”91 The court suggested that there is 
an interest protected by substantive due process in being “free from 
unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions upon their physical and emotional 
well-being, while directly or indirectly in state custody,”92 in addition “adequate 
to food, shelter, clothing and medical care.” 93 
This right is not to be construed as a right to be placed in an optimal home94 
or even to be placed at all,95 given that the interest in placement might have to be 
weighed against other competing interests such as the interests of the biological 
parents.96 Nonetheless, the limited rights in the foster care context establish that 
 
 86. See, e.g., Wendy H., 849 F. Supp. at 376  
The defendants” expert also highlights the fact that Finney had no way of knowing that 
the plaintiff was at risk . . . [but] that lack of knowledge is due in part to Finney’s acknowl-
edged neglect of her duties. . . . The implicit suggestion of this report is that had Finney re-
sponded to all the information that as a professional social worker she should have been 
aware of, Wendy H’s placement would have properly sat squarely on the “front burner” 
of her caseload. 
 87. See Elizabeth A. Varney, Trading Custody for Care: Why Parents Are Forced to Choose between 
the Two and Why the Government Must Support the Keeping Families Together Act, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
755, 780 (2004–05) (suggesting that inadequate training is a pervasive problem for those working in 
this area). 
 88. See id. 
 89. K.H., 914 F.2d at 853–854 (noting some of the constraints imposed by inadequate funding). 
 90. 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N. D. Ill. 1989). 
 91. Id. at 1394. 
 92. Id. at 1396. 
 93. Id.; see also Baby Neal v. Casey 821 F. Supp. 320, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev’d on other grounds  43 
F.3d 48 (noting that the “Supreme Court in Youngberg stated that the essentials of care which the 
state must provide under the due process clause are adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical 
care.” (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324) (emphasis added). 
 94. Charlie H. v. Whitman., 83 F. Supp.2d at 507 (D,N.J. 2000) (“However, this right to freedom 
from harm under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle Plaintiffs to 
an ‘optimal level of care and treatment.’”) (citing B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1397–98)). 
 95. Baby Neal, 821 F. Supp. at 335 (“Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to be free from harm while in 
foster care does not entitle them to the right to permanent placements or placement in preadoptive 
homes.”). 
 96. Collier, 763 F. Supp. at 476 (“Adoption always involves the weighing and balancing of many 
competing interests. The rights of a couple to adopt must be reconciled with the State’s interest in 
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the fact that an institution is created by the state does not preclude the existence 
of associated, constitutionally protected liberty interests. Indeed, the intimation 
by courts that the state is responsible for providing a minimal level of basic 
goods at least suggests that states have a responsibility not to impose arbitrary 
and unnecessary roadblocks to adoption. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED INTERESTS IN ADOPTION 
When discussing whether children have a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in being adopted, it is helpful to distinguish among a variety of different 
scenarios. Some children need to be placed in a permanent home, whereas 
others are already in a permanent home but nonetheless might benefit from a 
formal recognition of an existing parent-child relationship. Some children have 
one or more adults acting as parents, whereas other children have no one 
willing to take on the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. Some children 
are in the custody of the state, whereas others are in the custody of loving, albeit 
imperfect, private individuals or couples. It is at least in part because of the 
multiplicity of contexts in which adoption interests might be implicated that a 
nuanced discussion and analysis is required. 
A. Rights in the Adoption Context 
Courts and commentators have questioned whether it makes sense to talk 
about children’s rights more generally or children’s rights in the adoption 
context more particularly. Some believe that children’s interests are adequately 
represented by adults and, further, that affording rights to children would do 
more harm than good. Yet, such a view fails to account for those children’s 
rights that are already recognized and, further, ignores contexts in which 
children’s interests are not adequately represented by others. Children in need 
of placement are a prime example of those whose interests often are not 
adequately served by third parties. 
As an initial matter, it is too late to assert that children do not have rights. 
As the Court explained in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when 
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are 
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”97 
Of course, that is not to say that the rights of children and adults are 
equivalent. In Bellotti v. Baird,98 the Court noted “three reasons justifying the 
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with 
those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the 
parental role in child rearing.”99 The Bellotti Court noted that the “State 
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their 
 
protecting the existing rights of the natural parents, as well as in securing ultimately the welfare of the 
child.” (emphasis in original) (citing Lindley for Lindley, 889 F.2d at 131 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 97. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
 98. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). aff’g in part Baird v. Bellotti, 724 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 99. Id. at 634. 
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own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important 
decisions by minors,”100 suggesting that “[p]roperly understood, then, the 
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of 
individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the 
latter.”101 Indeed, the difficulty in reconciling the rights of children with the 
rights of their parents causes some to reject that children have rights in the 
placement context. 
B. Parental Rights 
Martin Guggenheim argues that there “is little doubt that children need 
rights against the exercise of state power.”102 However, he worries that according 
rights to children in the adoption context might work against the rights of 
parents, noting that the “threat to the parental rights doctrine stemming from 
child welfare is obvious: child welfare law uniquely authorizes government 
officials to remove children from their parents’ custody and even to sever 
permanently all legal ties between parents and children over the parents’ 
objection.”103 
Yet, whether or not children’s rights are recognized, there are serious 
concerns on the one hand that children might be separated from their parents 
too quickly or easily and on the other that the state’s failure to act might have 
dire consequences for a child. Basically, the state has a special interest in 
children,104 and a very important, although contentious, area involves how to 
balance the extremely important but possibly adverse interests that are 
implicated in situations where the state may seek to protect children by taking 
them away from their parents. 
As an initial matter, any intervention policy adopted by the state must 
account for the importance of parental rights. As the Troxel Court explained, 
“The liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized 
by this Court.”105 Further, where the parent has not been shown to be unfit or to 
have abandoned or neglected the child, the child’s interests are thought to 
coincide with the parent’s,106 and so the state’s recognizing children’s rights in 
this kind of case would do nothing to undermine the biological family. 
A number of limitations are imposed on the state insofar as it wishes to 
interfere with parental rights. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court 
 
 100. Id. at 637. 
 101. Id. at 638. 
 102. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 250 (Harvard University 
Press 2005). 
 103. Id. at 176. 
 104. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997) (noting “the State’s 
independent interest in the well-being of its youth”); Maryland v. Craig 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) 
(discussing “the State’s traditional and ‘transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children’”) 
(citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)). 
 105. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 106. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (“But until the State proves parental 
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their 
natural relationship.”). 
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explained that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that 
‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection.’”107 However, the Lassiter Court also recognized that “the State has an 
urgent interest in the welfare of the child,”108 concluding that in some but not all 
cases109 due process protections guarantee indigent parents the right to 
appointed counsel before their parental rights can be terminated.110 
When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, it must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that such rights should be terminated.111 The Santosky 
Court noted that the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they 
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.”112 On the other hand, the children’s interests might be severely impaired 
by remaining with parents who abuse or neglect them, and it is for this reason 
that the Court has adopted an intermediate, clear and convincing standard113 
rather than an even more difficult one in parental rights termination 
proceedings.114 A separate issue is whether other interests should be considered, 
such as those of the adults who may have been fostering a particular child for an 
extended period of time. 
C. OFFER 
The seminal case in which the Court discusses the different interests in the 
child placement context is Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and 
Reform (OFFER).115 OFFER is sometimes read as establishing that there is no 
federal constitutional right either to adopt or to be adopted,116 or as establishing 
 
 107. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 32 (deciding to “leave the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of 
counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the 
trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.”). 
 110. Id. at 31 
If, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at 
their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that the El-
dridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, 
and that due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel. 
 111. Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (“Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the 
rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by 
at least clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 112. Id. at 753. 
 113. See id. at 756 (“This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—’clear and 
convincing evidence’.”). 
 114. See id. at 790–91  
When, in the context of a permanent neglect termination proceeding, the interests of the 
child and the State in a stable, nurturing homelife are balanced against the interests of the 
parents in the rearing of their child, it cannot be said that either set of interests is so clearly 
paramount as to require that the risk of error be allocated to one side or the other. 
 115. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 116. See Christopher Colorado, Tying the Braid of Second-Parent Adoptions-Where Due Process Meets 
Equal Protection, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1430 (2005) (“Smith is often cited as the Supreme Court’s 
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that foster families do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
remaining intact.117 Certainly, it is fair to read OFFER as limiting the rights of 
foster families or even of would-be adoptive families,118 but such a reading is 
perfectly compatible with the recognition that interests of members of foster 
families or even would-be adoptive families have constitutional weight. 
At issue in OFFER was whether the individual interest in having the status 
of foster parent continue was “within the ‘liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”119 In attempting to resolve this issue, the Court distinguished 
foster families both from adoptive families and from biological families. The 
OFFER Court noted that foster placements are for a “planned period,”120 which 
makes them “unlike adoptive placement, which implies a permanent 
substitution of one home for another,”121 and distinguished the foster family 
from the biological family in a number of ways. For example, the Court noted 
that the 
law transfers ‘care and custody’ to the agency, but day-to-day supervision of the 
child and his activities, and most of the functions ordinarily associated with 
legal custody, are the responsibility of the foster parent. Nevertheless, agency 
supervision of the performance of the foster parents takes forms indicating that 
the foster parent does not have the full authority of a legal custodian.122 
The Court also noted that the biological parent has both rights and 
responsibilities, even when his or her child is in foster care. 
[T]he natural parent’s placement of the child with the agency does not surrender 
legal guardianship; the parent retains authority to act with respect to the child in 
certain circumstances. The natural parent has not only the right but the 
obligation to visit the foster child and plan for his future; failure of a parent with 
capacity to fulfill the obligation for more than a year can result in a court order 
terminating the parent’s rights on the ground of neglect.123 
 
determination that a constitutional right to adoption is unavailable because the adoption process 
lacks a fundamental constitutional quality.”); Stephanie R. Richardson, Strict Scrutiny, Biracial 
Children, and Adoption, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 214 (2002) (“Both the majority and concurring 
opinions in Smith illustrate that there is no federal constitutional protection for the right to adopt.”). 
 117. Barbara McLaughlin, Transracial Adoption in New York State, 60 ALB. L. REV. 501, 527 (1996) 
(“Many lower courts have utilized this decision in holding that there is no constitutionally protected 
liberty interest that grants a foster family the right to remain intact.”). 
 118. See Marylou L. v. Tenecha L., 698 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.,1999) (“the legal rights of 
foster parents are necessarily limited”) ; New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. M.R., 715 
A.2d 308, 314 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) (“While freedom of personal choice in certain family life 
decisions is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment [citing Santosky, 
455 U.S. at 753], it does not protect every aspect of family life.”) (citation omitted); Whalen v. County 
of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 404 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting OFFER to stand for the proposition that 
“foster families have, at best, a limited liberty interest in remaining together”);Matter of Michael B., 
604 N.E.2d 122, 128 (N.Y. 1992) (“Because of the statutory emphasis on the biological family as best 
serving a child’s long-range needs, the legal rights of foster parents are necessarily limited.”). 
 119. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 839. 
 120. Id. at 824.  
 121. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 122. Id. at 827 (citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 827–828. 
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Thus, foster parents and biological parents are to be distinguished in that 
the former may be making day-to-day decisions for the child but do not have 
the full legal rights and responsibilities that biological parents usually have. 
Further, even when a child is in foster care, the biological parents may continue 
to have rights and obligations with respect to that child. 
In many cases, the foster family can be distinguished from the biological 
family in that there are no blood ties between the foster family and the child.124 
The OFFER Court noted that “the usual understanding of ‘family’ implies 
biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent 
and child have stressed this element.”125 Yet, that was not the basis upon which 
OFFER was decided–the Court noted that “biological relationships are not 
exclusive determination of the existence of a family.”126 For example, the “basic 
foundation of the family in our society, the marriage relationship, is of course 
not a matter of blood relation.”127 
The OFFER Court explained that “the importance of the familial 
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and 
from the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a way of life’ through the instruction of 
children, as well as from the fact of blood relationship.”128 The Court considered 
it obvious that foster children can form deep and abiding bonds with their foster 
parents.129 “No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and 
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may 
exist even in the absence of blood relationship.”130 Indeed, 
where a child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his 
natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of 
the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the same 
place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing 
functions, as a natural family.131 
Thus, the Court understood that in some cases the foster family serves the 
very same functions as does the biological family and, all else being equal, might 
be as important to the individuals themselves and to society as a whole as the 
biological family. 
Nonetheless, the Court offered several reasons for its refusal to accord the 
requested relief to foster families. The Court worried that “social workers of 
middle-class backgrounds, perhaps unconsciously, incline to favor continued 
placement in foster care with a generally higher-status family rather than return 
the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias that treats the natural 
 
 124. Id. at 843 (“A biological relationship is not present in the case of the usual foster family.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 843. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231–233 (1972)). 
 129. Id. at 836 (“It is not surprising then that many children, particularly those that enter foster 
care at a very early age and have little or no contact with their natural parents during extended stays 
in foster care, often develop deep emotional ties with their foster parents.”). 
 130. Id. at 844. 
 131. Id. 
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parents’ poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the child.”132 
Further, when considering whether a foster family counted as “family” for 
constitutional purposes,133 the Court understood that there were other 
considerations that had to be weighed in the balance. For example, the Court 
noted that “ordinarily procedural protection may be afforded to a liberty 
interest of one person without derogating from the substantive liberty of 
another.”134 The situation at issue here was different, because the foster parents 
would be accorded rights at the expense of the biological parent. Thus, the Court 
explained, 
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbi-
trary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they 
have freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law 
recognition of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one may acquire 
such an interest in the face of another’s constitutionally recognized liberty inter-
est that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human 
right an interest the foster parent has recognized by contract from the outset.135 
Thus, the OFFER Court was not suggesting that there was no liberty 
interest of constitutional weight in the foster care context, but merely that 
“[w]hatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an 
institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed 
removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.”136 
Yet, this means that if the interests of the foster family are being considered in a 
context in which the interests of the biological family do not weigh in the 
balance, e.g., because the parental rights of the biological parents have already 
been terminated, then OFFER neither stands for the proposition that such 
interests do not have constitutional weight nor even for the proposition that 
whatever interests exist are significantly attenuated. 
The OFFER Court did distinguish the foster family from other families by 
noting that “the State here seeks to interfere, not with a relationship having its 
origins entirely apart from the power of the State, but rather with a foster family 
which has its source in state law and contractual arrangements.”137 Yet, the fact 
that the relationship had its source in state law did not end the matter. Indeed, 
the Court noted that “liberty interests may in some cases arise from positive-law 
sources.”138 However, the Court argued that “the limited recognition accorded to 
the foster family by the New York statutes and the contracts executed by the 
foster parents argue against any but the most limited constitutional ‘liberty’ in 
the foster family.”139 After all, most of the foster care placements were 
 
 132. Id. at 834. 
 133. See id. at 842 (“But is the relation of foster parent to foster child sufficiently akin to the 
concept of ‘family’ recognized in our precedents to merit similar protection?”). 
 134. Id. at 846. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 846–47. 
 137. Id. at 845. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 846. 
06__STRASSER.DOC 5/27/2008  2:09:09 PM 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 241 
presumably voluntary,140 and a parent might be less willing to place her children 
temporarily with the state if she believed that foster parents might acquire 
protected interests in those children as a result of that placement. However, 
were the interests of the biological parents not conflicting with those of the 
foster parents, e.g., because the biological parent’s interests had already been 
terminated, and were the interests or rights of the children at issue in accord 
with rather than contrary to those of the foster parents,141 OFFER would seem to 
support the notion that the interests of the foster family in remaining intact have 
constitutional weight. 
D. Applying OFFER in the Adoption Context 
Some of the worries articulated by the Court in OFFER are also applicable 
in the adoption context. For example, as the Seventh Circuit pointed out in 
Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan, the “adoption process is entirely a creature of state 
law, and parental rights and expectations involving adoption have historically 
been governed by legislative enactment.”142 More important than the mere fact 
that adoption is a creature of statute is that the rights of the would-be adoptive 
parent might be pitted against the rights of the biological parent, at least in 
certain circumstances. The Lindley court made clear that where there is such a 
conflict, the “rights of a couple to adopt must be reconciled with the state’s 
interest in protecting the existing rights of the natural parents, as well as in 
securing ultimately the welfare of the child.”143 Thus, although the Lindley court 
read OFFER as cautioning “that biological relationships do not exclusively 
determine the existence of a family,”144 it correctly understood that the 
recognition of an unqualified right either to adopt or to be adopted might come 
into conflict with the existing rights of parents. 
E. Adoption Statutes 
Given the fundamental interest of parents in the care, custody, and control 
of their children, it makes sense for states to structure foster care and adoption 
in ways which account for those rights. Suppose, however, that we consider 
statutes which limit adoption in ways which having nothing to do with 
preserving parental rights and may in fact undermine the welfare of children. 
Those are the kind of statutes which would seem to conflict with the United 
States Constitution. 
Consider the Florida statute which precludes members of the LGBT 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) community from adopting.145 This 
statute applies whether or not the biological parents of the would-be adopted 
 
 140. Id. at 824 (“Most foster care placements are voluntary.”). 
 141. The children’s interests were presumed to be in accord with those of the biological parents 
rather than those of the foster parents. Cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (discussing presumption that 
interests on the child and the biological parents coincide). 
 142. 889 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 143. Id. at 131 (citing OFFER, 431 U.S. at 846–47). 
 144. Id. at 130 (citing OFFER, 431 U.S. at 843). 
 145. See FLOR. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (2005) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may 
adopt is that person is a homosexual.”). 
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children have already had their parental rights terminated, whether or not the 
children are in fact being raised by the same-sex partner of their biological 
parent, and whether or not the only parent that the children have ever known 
would thereby be precluded from adopting them. Statutes like Florida’s have a 
very broad sweep and implicate a number of constitutional and public policy 
issues. 
In Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services, the 11th 
Circuit upheld Florida’s gay adoption ban.146 The facts of the case illustrate some 
of the reasons that such a ban is against public policy. Steve Lofton, an 
“exemplary” parent,147 was precluded from adopting a child whom he had been 
parenting for almost all of the thirteen years of the child’s life.148 This was done, 
allegedly, to promote the child’s best interests.149 
Professor Martin Guggenheim notes that “[c]hildren need and greatly 
benefit from a sense of security.”150 It is difficult to see how precluding an 
individual from legally cementing a parent-child relationship like the one at 
issue in Lofton would promote the child’s feelings of security or well-being.151 It 
was not as if Florida believed that it was bad for the child to be with Lofton, 
since the state was willing to make Lofton the child’s guardian.152 Rather, the 
state was willing to sacrifice the security and well-being of the child to further 
other goals.153 
Consider a different kind of case—a parent is raising her biological children 
with her same-sex partner. The non-biological parent wants to adopt her 
partner’s children, thereby establishing in law what already exists in fact. 
Precluding such an adoption even when the biological parent consents and the 
adoption would entitle the children to a whole range of benefits to which they 
would not otherwise be entitled is difficult to justify in terms of the best interests 
of the child.154 Professor Guggenheim writes, 
A generation ago, men were denied the right to be recognized as a parent for the 
sole reason that they did not marry the children’s mother. Ultimately, we came 
to appreciate that this requirement was arbitrary, having nothing to do with the 
 
 146. 358 F.3d 804,806(11th Cir. 2004) (“The district court granted summary judgment to Florida 
over an equal protection and due process challenge by homosexual persons desiring to adopt. We 
affirm.”). 
 147. See id. at 807. 
 148. Id. at 807. 
 149. See id. at 818 (“Florida argues that the statute is rationally related to Florida’s interest in 
furthering the best interests of adopted children.”). 
 150. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 102, at 37. See also W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
883, 891 (2006) (“Because stability is so important for children, it is a primary focus of modern 
adoption criteria in some states.”). 
 151. For further discussion of Lofton, see Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Lofton, and Reasoned Judgment: 
On Who Can Adopt and Why, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 473–93 (2005). 
 152. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808. 
 153. See Strasser, supra note 151, at 476 (“It is simply incredible that the child’s interests are cited 
to support this policy, when those interests are being sacrificed so that other policies of the state can 
be effectuated.”). 
 154. See In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198 (Pa. 2002) (discussing some of 
the benefits to the children of recognizing parental status in this kind of case). 
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significance of the already formed parent-child relationship. The same is true for 
non-marital partners who have children by other means than making one 
together biologically.155 
As a general matter, children fare better in two-parent homes than in one-
parent homes.156 Of course, in many circumstances it will be better for a child to 
be adopted by a single parent than to remain in foster care,157 and, it might be 
noted, single-parent adoptions have recently increased significantly.158 Yet, if 
children fare better in two-parent homes than in one-parent homes and if 
children fare better when adopted by singles than when remaining in foster 
care, there would seem to be ample reason to permit same-sex couples to adopt 
and LGBT individuals to adopt. 
Same-sex relationships, like different-sex relationships, sometimes do not 
last, either because one of the members of the couple dies or because the 
individuals drift apart. Yet, this is a reason to permit each member of a same-sex 
couple in a non-marital relationship to establish a legal relationship with the 
child they both are raising rather than to preclude the non-legal parent from 
doing so.159 Were the law to fail to recognize both parent-child relationships and 
were the adults’ relationship to end, the non-legal parent might be treated as a 
stranger to the child, even if the child’s best interests would be promoted by 
maintaining contact with that parent.160 
Florida’s adoption policy might be easier to understand if, for example, 
professional child advocacy groups advocated that adoptions by LGBT 
individuals not be permitted. The opposite, however, is true.161 Yet, given that 
 
 155. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 102, at 130. 
 156. Wilcox & Wilson, supra note 150, at 895 (“the research to date indicates that children raised 
in adopted two-parent homes do better than children raised in single-parent, biologically related 
homes”). 
 157. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 587 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (“The law permits single individuals to adopt a child on their own because one parent is 
better than none.”). 
 158. Wilcox & Wilson, supra note 150, at 886 (“Over the last twenty years, single parent 
adoptions have become the ‘fastest growing trend’ in the adoption industry.”); Elizabeth L. Maurer, 
Errors that Won’t Happen Twice: A Constitutional Glance at a Proposed Texas Statute that Will Ban 
Homosexuals from Foster Parent Eligibility, 5 APPALACHIAN J. L. 171, 187 (2006) (“The U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services estimates that, as of August 2004, nearly one-third of all children 
adopted from foster care in the United States were adopted by single persons”). 
 159. Given that Massachusetts is the only state permitting same-sex couples to marry, precluding 
both members of a nonmarital couple from establishing a legal relationship with the child they are 
raising imposes special burdens on LGBT families. 
 160. Cf. Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Constitution: On Rational Basis Scrutiny and 
the Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 297, 308 (2003) 
In many of the second-parent cases, the child views the non-marital partner as one of her 
parents and, in fact, may well have been raised by that adult as well as by the child’s bio-
logical or adoptive parent. That functional parental status notwithstanding, the non-
marital partner may be viewed by the law as a legal stranger to the child, which might be 
especially significant should something happen to the biological/adoptive parent. 
 161. See Megan Backer, Giving Lawrence Its Due: How the Eleventh Circuit Underestimated the Due 
Process Implications of Lawrence v. Texas in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family 
Services, 90 MINN. L. REV. 745, 774–75 (2006) (“[C]hild advocacy groups, including the Child Welfare 
League of America, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, and 
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such groups recognize that adoptions by LGBT would-be parents promote the 
interests of children, a state’s precluding such adoptions implies that children 
who might otherwise be placed in adoptive homes will not be.162 This simply 
cannot be justified in public policy terms. 
Commentators debate whether children will do as well when adopted by a 
same-sex couple as they would have if adopted by a different-sex couple. Yet, a 
few points might be made about that debate. First, the focus of that analysis is 
not whether children thrive in families headed by two adults of the same sex163 
but, instead, which parents are optimal. As should not be surprising, those few 
differences which are appearing in the literature do not clearly establish which 
set of parents is best. For example, some studies suggest that same-sex parents 
are more demanding than their different-sex counterparts.164 Other studies sug-
gest that same-sex parents are less rigid about traditional gender roles,165 while 
still other studies suggest that the children of same-sex parents are more willing 
to experiment to discover their sexual identity.166 Yet, each of these might be 
thought to favor same-sex couples. In any event, for the child who is in foster 
care, the issue should not be whether the potential adoptive home is the best 
possible placement but, instead, whether that home would be a place where the 
child could thrive. Thus, even if it could be established which parents were “op-
timal,” that would not undermine the contention that permitting an adoption by 
the non-optimal parents might nonetheless greatly benefit the child who, for ex-
ample, might otherwise be adopted by no one.167 
Consider one more kind of statute. Some states permit single adults to 
adopt and married couples to adopt but do not permit individuals in cohabiting, 
non-marital relationships to adopt.168 These statutes do not merely prevent both 
members of the couple from establishing a legal relationship with the same 
child, for example, by allowing one member of a couple to adopt as a single 
adult but then precluding the other member from adopting, but preclude either 
member from adopting. Such a law might be expected to have many unfortu-
 
the American Psychological Association, have made statements in support of allowing gay 
adoption”). 
 162. Cf. Maurer, supra note 158, at 172 (“the most recent calculations indicated that there were 
qualified adoptive families and single parents available for just twenty percent of all children in 
foster care”). 
 163. See Mark Strasser, Adoption and the Best Interests of the Child: On the Use and Abuse of 
Studies, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 629, 632 (2004) (“Studies show that children thrive in households with 
same-sex parents as well as in households with different-sex parents.”). 
 164. See Strasser, supra note 151, at 489. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See STRASSER, supra note 163, at 632 (“Neither same-sex nor different-sex parents can 
plausibly be denied the right to adopt based on the likely effects on the children that they would be 
adopting, especially when one considers what may well happen to the children if they remain 
unadopted.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 78-30-1(3)(b)(1953) 
A child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a 
legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state. For purposes of this Sub-
section (3)(b), “cohabiting” means residing with another person and being involved in a 
sexual relationship with that person. 
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nate consequences. For example, it might force an individual to end his/her re-
lationship with another adult in order to be eligible to adopt. Yet, if as a general 
matter two parents are better for children than one, then by adopting such a 
statute the state may be precluding the adoptive child from having as good an 
adoptive setting as the child otherwise would have had. Or, perhaps the indi-
viduals who wish to adopt a child are nonetheless unwilling to end their non-
marital relationship in order to become eligible to adopt. In that event, there 
may well be children who would have been placed in two-parent homes but 
now will not be placed in any home. The state will have made everyone worse 
off—the child, the would-be adoptive parents, and society itself. 
It is of course true that legislatures should have some latitude when 
making laws, especially when those laws concern one of society’s most 
important assets—its children. Yet, it is not at all clear that states should have 
the latitude to create laws which make all of the relevant parties worse off than 
they would have been without the law at issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Those who claim that there can be no constitutionally protected interests in 
adopting or being adopted because adoption is a creature of statute are failing to 
consider some of the lessons offered by the foster care jurisprudence. Those 
lessons include both that interests created by statute can nonetheless be 
constitutionally protected and, perhaps, that professional judgments about the 
suitability of LGBT would-be parents should be given some weight. Indeed, the 
decision to let children remain in foster care rather than permit them to be 
adopted by parents who would love them and help them to thrive suggests a 
kind of reckless indifference to the welfare of children in the interest of serving 
other, unarticulated goals. 
The claim here is not that a public official in a state with a statute 
precluding members of the LGBT community from adopting would somehow 
be liable under § 1983, although it is suggested that such a statute should be 
viewed as unconstitutional because it is not rationally related to the promotion 
of the asserted goal of promoting the welfare of children. Such a statute should 
also be held unconstitutional because it does not give adequate weight to the 
constitutionally protected liberty interests of those who would adopt and those 
who would be adopted, at least in those cases where there are no competing 
interests of biological parents. 
When downplaying the interests of foster families in remaining intact, the 
OFFER Court was careful to make clear that it was doing so because the rights of 
the biological parents weighed in the balance. Further, implicit in that decision 
was the presumption that the child’s interests coincided with those of her 
biological parents. Yet, where the interests of the biological parents are not at 
issue and where the child would be benefited by not only remaining with the 
foster or would-be adoptive family but also by having the parental 
relationship(s) given legal recognition, the implicated interests should be 
recognized as being constitutionally protected. 
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Supreme Court cautioned courts not to 
close their “eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the 
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family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.”169 The Moore Court recognized that the “institution of the family 
is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”170 but also made clear 
that family could not be narrowly construed by the State. Indeed, the Moore 
Court noted that the Constitution prevents the state “from standardizing its 
children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family 
patterns.”171 
Those who ignore the functions performed by foster families or non-marital 
couples raising children are closing their eyes to the reasons that family is 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court should take the first 
available opportunity to open the eyes of those who fail to see how society and 
the individuals themselves are benefited by such families, while at the same 
time explaining how the rights of biological and adoptive parents are not at all 
diminished by this inclusiveness. 
 
 169. 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977). 
 170. Id. at 503. 
 171. Id. at 506. 
